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In his paper, Pettit presents a paradox that may arise when a group must vote on an 
interconnected set of propositions. Even though every individual within the group may be 
perfectly consistent in her own views, or individually rational, the propositions that the 
group would accept as the result of a majority vote on each individual proposition are 
inconsistent, so the group is collectively irrational. Pettit distinguishes between two ways a 
group may deal with this dilemma: the rationality-first approach, where the institution is 
committed to some mechanism for prioritising one of the propositions despite the votes of 
the individuals within it, and the responsiveness-first approach, where, although re-votes 
may be taken, the institution has no formal means for prioritising propositions when 
individually rational preferences aggregate to be collectively irrational. Given the argument 
presented in the paper, you will have to forgive me if I say that, whilst I agree with the 
conclusion, that we should take a rationality-first approach, I debate the propositions on 
which that conclusion is based. In my response I will explain why I think that, for all 
practical purposes, the rationality-first approach is  inevitable for democratic institutions, 
regardless of supporting arguments  that deliberative democrats  might supply. This implies 
that the real argument is not whether we should achieve collective rationality but how, so I 
shall go on to examine whether arguments from deliberation can shed any light on this 
issue. Finally, I will say something about putting deliberation more directly into this type of 
decision-making model.
 Regardless of contestability and conversability, as Pettit himself points out, the 
rationality-first approach is effectively enforced on most deliberative institutions. There is 
an analogy between the institutional and individual agents that may help to make the 
reason for this clear. An individual has a belief system consisting of multiple propositions 
which she endorses. Then in decision-making situations her choices  are based on these. 
For an individual, the belief system is primary, in the sense that the beliefs  exist prior to the 
need to make decisions or to act and a person may hold beliefs  that she will never act on. 
In contrast, most institutional deliberation is  primarily about deciding what actions to take 
and the endorsement of propositions happens purely as a stage in this process. Although 
the action to be taken may depend on the endorsement of certain premises  by either the 
individuals within the group or the group as a whole, inevitably the key question is whether 
to convict the defendant or which policy to implement. And, unlike the individual case, the 
decision is  probably only taken once, or at least fairly infrequently, so that if there are any 
inconsistencies in the propositions endorsed, agenda manipulation is  more likely to be a 
problem than the possibility of cycles which is so often discussed in the individual case.
 To continue the comparison, whilst an individual may take a responsiveness-first 
approach and endorse a set of propositions which provide conflicting reasons for action, 
when the time comes to act these inconsistencies must somehow be resolved. Otherwise 
the individual faces paralysing indecision with potentially disastrous consequences, as did 
Buridan’s ass. So some reason is  found for prioritising certain propositions  in the belief 
system. Of course, an individual could chose to do nothing, but this often amounts to doing 
something in the sense of promoting a particular outcome. Or another response could be 
for the individual to chose to randomise between possible actions but, in practice, it is the 
case that individuals do not like to randomise. Experimental evidence shows that humans 
are very bad at randomising when asked explicitly to do so1 but, more importantly, when 
the issues at stake are important we tend to think that ‘I flipped a coin’ or ‘I threw a dice’ is 
not an acceptable justification for action. We believe that actions should be based on 
reasons relevant to the case in hand. Unlike an individual agent, an institution does not 
usually have the luxury of a period where it can endorse conflicting propositions  before 
having to choose an action. The endorsement of propositions happens synchronically with 
the making of decisions so that, unless we are willing to advocate that our institutions 
randomise or do nothing when faced with this type of paradox, the rationality-first approach 
will effectively trump the responsiveness-first approach. This conclusion does not depend 
for its force on any arguments from deliberation.
 The question we are left with then, is  which propositions should take priority when 
inconsistencies arise. Although it might seem that the group itself could decide in each 
instance, there is reason to think that guidelines should be chosen in advance. If both 
procedural and substantive reasons  are decided at the same time, then there is the 
possibility of strategic voting by agents on the first question, of which proposition takes 
precedence, in order to ensure their favored outcome on the second question, of what the 
policy should be. 
 As Pettit points out, a deliberative group may be able to achieve consistency by 
modifying its  judgement on any of the three propositions. However, I have nothing to say 
about this case but instead will focus  on the cases where, as in the judicial example, the 
1 Smith (1999).
propositions fall naturally into premises and conclusions. I think that this actually covers 
more cases than is apparent at first sight. If one grants  that people tend to form their 
judgements about complex propositions from their judgements about simple propositions 
then a large class  of problems, including those involving conjunctions and disjunctions, will 
have this  form, with the simple propositions as the premises and the complex ones as the 
conclusions. The analogy with the individual case might then suggest that the collective 
judgements on the premises should drive the collective judgements on the conclusion. 
That is also the approach that Pettit’s republican deliberative democratic conversability 
and contestability arguments support. I do think that, where the group is such that it is 
natural to think of the collective as having a single agency, there is a presumption for 
resolving the dilemma in this premise-driven manner. (So this  might cover ‘the party 
thinks...’ or ‘the government says…’ but I am not sure that it includes the judges in the 
original example.) However, there are other considerations that drive in the opposite 
direction and I think that there are occasions on which these have force. In order to 
elaborate on these, I shall draw on work done elsewhere, to which Philip Pettit has been a 
chief contributor.
 As is mentioned in the paper, there is a line of argument which, following the 
Marquis  de Condorcet, advocates democratic procedures because of their increased 
chance of ‘getting it right’. This argument favors a conclusion-driven approach to the 
paradox, with individual judgements on the conclusion being aggregated to get the 
collective judgement. The simple intuition is that voting on the premises makes the 
collective more likely to be correct about the premises and therefore right for the right 
reasons. But, since the conclusions are a complex combination of the premises, there are 
other ways of reaching the correct conclusion, though for the wrong reasons. For instance, 
if the truth is P∨Q, then one could get to the correct conclusion by believing P∧¬Q, Q∧¬P 
or P∧Q but only one of these combinations of premises is true. The conclusion-driven 
approach maximises the collective’s chance of reaching the right judgement, albeit for the 
wrong reasons.2 The argument by Pettit is  that, if a republican deliberative democrat cares 
about conversability and contestability, then she should care about being right for the right 
reasons and therefore endorse the premise-driven approach.3  However, I think that the 
analogy to the individual case shows why there may sometimes be exceptions to this rule. 
2 Pettit and Rabinowicz (2001).
3 Pettit (2001).
 When we consider beliefs it is  as, if not more, important to endorse a proposition for 
the right reasons as it is to endorse the correct proposition. But, as I have said earlier, 
collective decision-making is generally with regard to proposed actions, not abstract belief 
systems. With actions, it is possible that it is better to do the right thing for the wrong 
reasons than to increase one's chance of having the right reasons at the expense of one's 
chance of doing the right thing. In other words, when actions are involved, consequences 
arguably matter as much as reasons. A concrete example of relevance to deliberative 
institutions is the criminal trial. In our society we have a preference that the innocent go 
free. If we take the judicial example in the paper but change it to a murder trial and let P = 
the defendant killed the victim, Q = the defendant had intent to kill the victim then the 
verdict of murder depends on the truth of the conjunction P∧Q. In this case we may prefer 
to maximise our chances of reaching the correct verdict. It is  more important simply to be 
right than to be right for the right reasons. 
 Another type of occasion when deliberative institutions may be more concerned 
about conclusions than premises is when making certain political decisions. In a multi-
cultural society we need to find a basis acceptable to all on which we can live together. We 
search for a Rawlsian ‘overlapping consensus’ on our public institutions even if citizens 
have differing underlying conceptions of the good. For instance, consider changing the 
example in that Pettit’s paper to the questions  of whether we should allow parents to opt 
out of state schools  and educate their children privately. Let P = parents have a right to 
educate their children privately, Q = we should educate our children within their religious 
faith. In this case we use a disjunction rule and if P∨Q is true then we should allow private 
schooling. Now there might plausibly be three different groups in our society. Libertarians 
believe P∧¬Q, the religious  believe Q∧¬P and Liberals believe ¬P∧¬Q. If we aggregated 
premises then we would have a majority for ¬P and a majority for ¬Q, so we would not 
allow people to opt out of the state system. However, if we aggregate conclusions then we 
would get a majority in favor of P∨Q, so we would allow private schools. In this case we 
may prefer to aggregate individual judgements on conclusions precisely because we 
believe that the job of public institutions is not to judge the premises. We are not looking to 
enforce the ‘right’ reasons on those we disagree with but to get enough agreement on 
conclusions about how we structure our society so that its  institutions will be acceptable to 
differing groups within it. Within the political arena, following Rawls, some liberals  explicitly 
do not judge the individual conceptions of the good underlying our shared public intuitions. 
For them, it is more important to agree on conclusions than to have the right reasons.
 Even a deliberative democrat with a presumption in favour of having the right 
reasons may think that there are occasions when it is more important to either be right 
about or to agree on the conclusions than to be right about or to agree on reasons. But, 
anyway, it seems to me that all the preceding arguments could as easily be made by a 
Rawlsian who believes in public justification without any reference to deliberative 
democracy. So far, I have said a lot about democracy but very little about deliberation. 
 Finally, let me make some comments about where deliberation might fit into this  
model. The paradoxes presented are all aggregation problems. In other words they may 
be faced in any democratic decision-making situation, not just those involving deliberation. 
Deliberative democrats  may have particular reasons to argue that the dilemma should be 
solved in one way rather than another but the model itself does nothing to capture the 
deliberation process. Models cannot be expected to capture everything, by their nature 
they simplify situations in order to clarify key points. One key feature of deliberation, which 
is  often used as an argument in its  favour and which is missing from the model, is  that 
deliberation changes peoples’ preferences. During deliberation some types of preferences 
are ruled out and people begin to come to a consensus. These aggregation models 
assume that voters' opinions are independent of each other. If they have spent time 
deliberating, then one might hope or expect that this is not the case. Adjusting the model 
to reflect simple correlation of voter preferences does not affect the mathematical results. 
However, another way in which deliberation may change preferences is  that, rather than 
correlating opinions on particular issues, it causes voters to structure the argument and the 
issues at stake in a common manner. It has been formally proved that if deliberation 
induces sufficient preference structuration then deliberative democrats will avoid such 
doctrinal paradoxes.4  Such arguments  provide a resolution of the dilemma that is  truly 
unique to deliberative democrats.
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